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Patent issues surrounding CRISPR, the revolutionary genetic editing technology, may have important 
implications for the public health. Patents maintain high prices for novel therapies, limiting patient 
access. Relatedly, insurance coverage for expensive therapies is waning. Patents also misallocate 
research and development resources to profitable disease indications rather than those that necessarily 
impinge on the public health. And it is unclear how CRISPR therapies will figure into the current 
regulatory framework for biosimilars. Policy makers and physicians should consider these issues now, 
before CRISPR therapies become widely adopted—and entrenched—in the marketplace.
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INTRODUCTION
The gene-editing technology known as clustered 
regularly interspaced palindromic repeats (CRISPR†), 
has the potential to revolutionize medicine [1]. Gene 
therapy—the treatment of disease by modifying the 
genome of patients’ cells—has a long history of scientific 
and therapeutic complications, as well as failed promises 
[2]. But CRISPR promises a cheap, precise, high-yield, 
and—it is hoped—therapeutically tolerable mechanism 
to edit the genome in living tissue [1]. It is, in the eyes of 
many, the “holy grail” of genetic engineering [3].
Whether CRISPR will fulfill such promises remains 
unclear. But in the meantime, CRISPR’s basic technology 
is subject to numerous foundational patents, many of 
which are licensed by biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
companies. Those patents, in turn, allow therapeutic 
developers to control how CRISPR will be developed 
into therapies and the prices—often high prices—charged 
to distribute them [4]. To that end, CRISPR is poised to 
suffer from the same pitfalls as other newly developed 
biopharmaceuticals. It is unknown, for example, how 
developers will price CRISPR-based therapies, given 
both the novelty of the treatment and, it seems, unslakable 
public demand [5]. It is also unknown—given recent 
trends and legislation to the contrary—whether insurers 
will broadly cover CRISPR therapies [6]. Given the 
high licensing fees associated with CRISPR patents, it is 
uncertain whether therapeutic developers will focus on 
high-impact or neglected genetic diseases, or simply turn 
to more profitable ones [7]. And it is unclear how patents 
covering CRISPR therapies will fit into the current legal 
framework concerning follow-on treatments, like generic 
drugs and biosimilars [8]. This article explores the future 
impact of CRISPR patents on these important public 
health issues.
PRICING
The pricing of drugs remains one of the most 
significant issues to the public interest—and the public 
health [9]. The public, press, and legislators throughout 
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the country have responded to recent reports of drug price 
increases with a staccato of fury and investigations [10]. 
Patients priced out of or underinsured to receive critical 
medicines stymie larger public health goals [9].
While the logic behind drug pricing remains almost 
entirely opaque, one element in its calculus is patent 
protection. Patents allow drug developers to charge 
monopoly prices for limited times [11]. This is, indeed, 
the point. Research and development is expensive and 
uncertain. So are clinical trials, more of which fail than 
succeed [12]. In the classic economic account, patents 
allow developers of biopharmaceuticals to recoup these 
costs and hedge against the uncertainty of future projects’ 
successes or failures [13].
This logic has historically dictated the extreme cost 
of gene-therapies. Gene-therapies are difficult to research, 
inordinately costly to shepherd through clinical trials, and 
wildly uncertain in their outcomes [14]. Furthermore, 
even gene-therapies that receive approval from the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) often serve limited 
populations—and what revenue developers cannot make 
up through demand they must make back by restricting 
supply [12]. Lastly, gene-therapies are often, by their 
nature, permanent: there is rarely the possibility that 
patients will pay for the drug, perennially, throughout 
their lifetimes [15]. These are among the reasons why 
the sticker-price for Glybera (alipogene tiparvovec)—a 
gene-therapy used to treat severe familial lipoprotein 
lipase deficiency—was $1 million [16].
There is no reason to believe CRISPR therapies 
will not be the same. CRISPR, despite its promises of 
precision and ease, remains difficult to immediately 
translate into therapeutic products [8]. Juno Therapeutics, 
for example, spent almost $300 million researching 
certain immunological-based CRISPR therapies, known 
as CRISPR CAR-T [17]. CAR-T, short for chimeric 
antigen receptor T-cell, works by removing T-cells from 
a patient’s blood, modifying them to express a non-native 
antibody directed to presenting antigens on leukemic 
B-cells, and reinjecting them back into the patient [18]. 
Ideally, these modified T-cells then target the patient’s 
cancerous B-cells, providing an elegant way of using the 
body’s own immune system—with modifications—as 
a cancer treatment. Inexplicable neurotoxicity issues in 
Juno’s trial, however, left 5 out of 38 trial participants 
dead, forcing Juno to almost entirely strike its research 
program [19]. Any eventually successful therapy derived 
from Juno’s CRISPR CAR-T platform will likely to be 
priced in a way to make up for these losses and the costs 
of developing further research [20]. To that end, patents 
covering CRISPR in this area are valuable precisely 
because they function as an asset to command such prices 
[14].
Similarly, patents would allow developers of CRISPR 
therapies to price their products in a way that makes up for 
low patient demand, either because the disease indication 
sought to be treated is rare or, like Glybera, the treatment 
is a one-time dose [14]. Glybera, in fact, provides a 
sterling example of patents covering rare-indication, 
permanent gene therapies; the treatment is protected 
by at least eight patent families, covering the viral 
vector, protein expression systems, and manufacturing 
processes, with multiple patents and patent applications 
for each family [21]. CRISPR developers are famously 
making use of extensive patent families like these, with 
enormous licensing fees paid to collaborators [4]. The 
ultimate retail prices of these and related therapies can be 
astronomical. Novartis’s Kymriah (tisagenlecleucel)—
the first approved CAR-T therapy, albeit without using 
CRISPR—costs $475,000 [22]. It stands to reason that 
such patents will likely make any CRISPR therapies for 
rare diseases similarly expensive.
The potential price of patented CRISPR therapies 
also illuminates a larger point about drug pricing: it allows 
developers to set profit maximizing prices independent 
of the marginal costs of production [23]. That is, patents 
allow drug developers to price their products as high as 
the market will bear regardless of how much therapies 
cost to make. This is important for CRISPR-based 
therapies sought to replace expensive-to-produce, multi-
dose drugs. Monoclonocal antibody therapy, for example, 
is typically costly and difficult to manufacture, store, and 
provide to patients [24]. CRISPR-based alternatives may 
ultimately be cheaper to produce. But patent coverage 
of the product allows the therapy’s developer to set 
prices far enough above this manufacturing cost as to 
make it irrelevant [23]. The ease, cost, and permanency 
of CRISPR therapies do not necessarily mean they will 
be cheaper than companion therapies, especially where 
patents are involved.
INSURANCE COVERAGE
Relatedly, patents covering CRISPR therapies may 
affect how and whether insurers are willing to cover them. 
Typically, patents for novel therapies mean only a single 
source of the therapeutic—the original developer—who, 
in turn, can price the therapy at extraordinary prices. 
Insurers, by and large, pick up the tab. This system works 
to maintain high prices for a number of reasons: insurers 
rarely refuse to cover novel therapies—and, in some 
instances, public insurance is prohibited from doing so. 
Increasingly, insurers often work through prescription 
benefit managers (PBMs) to receive discounts on drugs’ 
sticker prices [9]. And the American public has become 
used to the expense of novel therapies [25]. On these 
points, it would seem that virtually any patented CRISPR 
therapy would likely be covered by insurers.
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But times are changing. In some cases, prices have 
become so extraordinary that insurers have done the 
unthinkable: they have refused to cover even novel 
therapies. Sarepta Therapeutics’ Exondys 51 (eteplirsen) 
provides a shocking example. Sarepta’s drug—a novel 
RNA interference oligonucleotide intended to treat 
Duchenne muscular dystrophy—showed little promise 
in clinical trials. A single, twelve-person study—the only 
post-exploratory study presented to an FDA Advisory 
Committee—showed no statistically significant clinical 
benefit in patients [26]. Nonetheless, FDA stunningly 
approved the drug after a contentious internal debate 
[27]. Insurers, however, were unpersuaded by the 
clinical data—or the drug’s $750,000 annual price tag, 
a consequence, in part, of a successful patent campaign 
against one of its competitors, BioMarin Pharmaceutical 
[28,29]. As a consequence, a number of insurers have 
outright refused to cover Exondys 51 or demanded 
coverage be tied to burdensome testing [24]. A patented, 
expensive, and clinically questionable CRISPR therapy 
would likely face the same challenges.
Aside from insurers’ reluctance to pay for new, 
expensive therapies, the nature of health insurance 
itself is beginning to change. A number of legislative 
proposals currently before Congress would both shrink 
the overall insured population in the United States and, 
in some cases, allow insurers to refuse coverage to 
patients with pre-existing conditions. These proposals 
would drastically limit access to new CRISPR therapies. 
First, legislative proposals to limit the number of patients 
receiving Medicaid—by some Congressional Budget 
Office estimates, 15 million patients—would essentially 
“price out” any patented, expensive CRISPR therapies of 
poorer, working class Americans, unlikely to be able to 
afford such therapies out-of-pocket [6].
Even without shrinking Medicaid, private insurers 
would likely refuse to cover patients’ use of CRISPR 
for pre-existing conditions, if current proposals become 
law. As gene therapy, CRISPR therapy would be 
typically indicated for congenital rather than acquired 
conditions [8]. Current clinical research using CRISPR 
has consequently focused on congenital diseases, such 
as sickle cell anemia, that would indeed be considered 
“pre-existing conditions” under currently pending 
legislation [30]. As a consequence, insurers may have 
few covered beneficiaries to use CRISPR therapies in the 
first instance. And even though CRISPR therapy may, 
in fact, make some beneficiaries healthy in the long run, 
insurers would be further encouraged to decline coverage 
precisely because patents covering such treatments 
would likely keep prices high [9]. Patents, prices, and 
pre-existing conditions may make CRISPR unavailable 
for many Americans.
NEGLECTED DISEASES
Drug development operates under market incentives; 
therapeutics companies research treatments that stand to 
make them money. Patents therefore play a significant 
role in the development of drug candidates. Without some 
form of intellectual property protection, therapeutics 
companies often cannot charge the sort of super-
competitive prices that generate windfall profits [13]. 
Indeed, one of the very first checkpoints in the lifecycle 
of drug development is a “patent screen”—legal rather 
than scientific research to see how much of the patent 
landscape can be claimed for a new drug [31].
This patent-based system of therapeutic research and 
development has both positive and negative consequences 
for the public health. Generally speaking, therapeutic 
developers have strong interests to develop therapeutics 
affecting the greatest number of people [13]. From a high-
altitude perspective, this indeed looks like the landscape 
of drug approvals: out of 22 drugs approved by FDA in 
2016, six were indicated for treating cancer, the second-
highest cause of disease mortality in the United States 
[32]. And in 2015, eight of the 45 new drugs approved 
were indicated for some form of heart disease, the single 
greatest cause of mortality—disease or otherwise—in the 
United States [33].
But there are two negative corollaries to this patent-
influenced, market-based approach. First, rare diseases 
are typically woefully under-researched. By definition, 
the therapeutic market for rare diseases is smaller and, 
as a consequence, therapeutics developers have fewer 
incentives to cure or treat patients suffering from them 
[34]. Programs to bridge this “incentive gap” have had 
only halting success [35]. Second, where the market is 
large enough, this encourages developers to focus on, and 
obtain patents covering, “vanity diseases”—cosmetic 
conditions that have minimal public health impact [36]. 
Viagra (sildenafil)—a small molecule drug indicated for 
the treatment of “erectile dysfunction”—stands testament 
to this intersection of patents and the public health. 
Prior to Viagra, erectile dysfunction was not formally 
classified as a medical condition. But the surprise 
success of the drug—in combination with a powerful 
patent estate and broad market appeal—helped chisel 
“erectile dysfunction” into the medical canon [37]. As a 
consequence, a number of follow-on drugs, namely, Cialis 
(tadalafil) and Levitra (vardenafil), were independently 
developed at great expense, even though the public health 
benefits of the drugs were scant. In economic terms, “me-
too” drugs for vanity conditions “attract more investment 
than is socially optimal” [32].
These realities of the research enterprise are likely 
to impact CRISPR therapies as well. Even where the use 
of CRISPR for orphan diseases may be socially optimal, 
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world’s best-selling biologic, is covered by over 100 [43]. 
As a consequence, the availability of biosimilars—from a 
patient perspective—is significantly more restricted than 
generic drugs.
It is unclear where a given CRISPR therapy 
would fit into this model, although given the nature of 
the technology, most CRISPR therapies are likely to 
fall on the biologic side of the divide. To that end, the 
complex interaction of patents and biosimilar products 
are likely to hinder the availability of biosimilar CRISPR 
therapies once they come online. Like Humira’s patent 
fortress, the CRISPR patent estate is growing—and with 
multiple players competing for influence and licensing 
arrangements. Simply resolving the patent claims for a 
CRISPR biosimilar is likely to be arduous. Even more 
perniciously, the same companies developing specific 
CRISPR therapies also hold foundational patents 
required to practice basic elements of the technology [4]. 
Should these companies ever put a CRISPR product on 
the market, it seems unlikely they would license these 
patents to direct, biosimilar competitors.
Any path forward to developing not only novel 
CRISPR therapies but biosimilars to those therapies 
must find its way through this thicket of foundational 
and ancillary CRISPR patents. While the current 
biosimilar patent regime contemplates patents covering 
specific therapies, it seems ill-fitted to patents covering 
foundational aspects of a “platform technology”—a 
technology broadly used to develop specific downstream 
applications [4]. Humira’s patent estate, for example, has 
only the potential to block the development of a narrow 
class of biosimilars, i.e., other anti-tumor necrosis factor 
α antibodies. It would be unlikely to slow the approval of 
other antibody therapies, generally. But the CRISPR patent 
estate—with patents covering virtually limitless classes 
of CRISPR therapies—could be used, in the context of 
the biosimilar patent regime, to delay biosimilars directed 
to any CRISPR-based therapy, regardless of therapeutic 
application or molecular target. Whether the foundational 
CRISPR patents will be wielded that way remains to be 
seen. But the interaction of these regimes—the biologics 
patent regime and the CRISPR patent thicket—suggests 
that even if CRISPR therapies were developed, cheaper 
CRISPR biosimilars are unlikely to be developed, much 
like expensive biologics today.
CONCLUSION
The patent issues likely to arise for CRISPR-
based therapies present some difficult challenges for 
the public health, writ large. Pricing patented CRISPR 
therapies to make them broadly affordable while ensuring 
insurance coverage of those therapies will require a 
careful balancing of the significant commercial risk in 
it may be economically inefficient: without broad patents 
covering the technology, small built-in patient populations 
may not generate enough revenues to sustain a research 
program. More specifically, the incentives to develop 
CRISPR therapies that use known, basic mechanisms 
to tackle rare diseases may simply be unattractive to 
shepherd through the rigors of FDA approval if those 
mechanisms cannot themselves be patented. Further, 
“passive medicalization” of vanity conditions—such as 
Latisse (bimatoprost) for eyelash growth—may direct 
CRISPR research elsewhere. While physicians may view 
gene therapy as an extreme measure for cosmetic issues, 
that view may not hold for much longer [38].
BIOSIMILARS
The public health is best served not just by the 
development of new drugs, but access to them once 
developed. Counterintuitively, one of the more faithful 
creatures to drug access is a product of the patent system 
itself: generic drugs and biosimilars. Both generics and 
biosimilars are copies of an FDA-approved therapeutic. 
But because the same product has already been approved 
by FDA, generics and biosimilars path to regulatory 
approval is easier: their manufacturers can rely on a 
pioneers’ clinical trial data to prove safety and efficacy. At 
the same time, approval is also predicated on the pioneer’s 
patents covering the “reference listed drug” expiring or, 
more frequently, successfully challenging those patents 
in court [39]. Once launched, generic companies of new 
drugs often sell for less than 20 percent of the brand’s 
price, and in some instances, as low as marginal cost—
the cost, say, of physically manufacturing the pill [40]. In 
this sense, generics and biosimilars can be thought of as 
function of patent system: they exist because the law ties 
together regulatory approval with patents.
This idealized version of the generic drug system 
gets more complicated for biologics, large molecule, 
biologically manufactured therapies, like monoclonal 
antibodies. Biosimilars—analogous to generic drugs—
cannot entirely rely on pioneer manufacturers’ clinical 
data for FDA approval; they must also conduct smaller 
clinical trials demonstrating the two products are “highly 
similar” and that there are “no clinically meaningful 
differences” between them. Patent challenges, too, 
are more complicated. Unlike brand-generic patent 
litigation—typically, a single Götterdämmerung of 
litigation in federal court—biosimilar patent litigation 
is a complicated process, consisting of multiple rounds 
of negotiations and lawsuits [35]. In addition, because 
manufacturing biologics is so complex, a biologic product 
is typically covered by more patents than a small molecule 
drug [41]. The average small molecule drug, for example, 
is covered by 3.5 patents [42]; Humira (adalimumab), the 
Sherkow: CRISPR, patents, and the public health 671
search and Development Changing? Pharmacoeconomics. 
2004;22(Suppl 2):15-24.
14. Danzon P, Towse A. The Economics of Gene Therapy and 
of Pharmacogenetics. Value Health. 2002;5(1):5-13.
15. Edelstein ML, Abedi MR, & Wixon J. Gene Therapy Clin-
ical Trials Worldwide to 2007—An Update. J Gene Med. 
2007;9(10):833-842.
16. Regalado A. The World’s Most Expensive Medicine Is a 
Bust. MIT Tech Rev. 2016 May 4. Available from: https://
www.technologyreview.com/s/601165/the-worlds-most-ex-
pensive-medicine-is-a-bust/.
17. Juno Therapeutics, Inc., Annual Report on Form 10-K. 
Mar. 1, 2017. Available from: https://www.last10k.com/
sec-filings/juno
18. Sadelain M, Brentjens R, & Rivière I. The Basic Principles 
of Chimeric Antigen Receptor Design. Cancer Discov. 
2013;3(4):388-398.
19. Lash A. After Trial Deaths, Juno Pivots and Scraps Lead 
CAR-T Therapy. Xconomy. 2017 Mar 1. Available from: 
http://www.xconomy.com/seattle/2017/03/01/after-trial-
deaths-juno-pivots-and-scraps-lead-car-t-therapy/.




21. uniQure. Gene Therapy: Intellectual Property. Available 
from: http://www.uniqure.com/gene-therapy/gene-thera-
py-intellectual-property.php.
22. Garde D. Pioneering Cancer Drug, Just Approved, To Cost 
$475,000—And Analysts Say It’s A Bargain. STAT News. 
2017 Aug 30. Available from:  https://www.statnews.
com/2017/08/30/novartis-car-t-cancer-approved/.
23. Danzon PM & Towse A. Differential Pricing for Pharma-
ceuticals: Reconciling Access, R&D, and Patents. Int J 
Health Care Finance Econ. 2003;3(3):183-205.
24. Carter PJ. Potent Antibody Therapeutics by Design. Nat 
Rev Immun. 2006;6:343-357.
25. Kanavos P, et al. Higher US Branded Drug Prices and 
Spending Compared to Other Countries May Stem Partly 
from Quick Uptake of New Drugs. Health Aff (Millwood). 
2013;32(4):753-761.
26. Pollack A. F.D.A. Advisers Rebuff Muscular Dystrophy 
Drug. New York Times. 2016 Apr 25; Sect. B1.
27. Kesselheim AS & Avorn J. Approving a Problematic Mus-
cular Dystrophy Drug. JAMA. 2016;316(22):2357-2358.
28. Thomas K. A Costly Drug for a Fatal Disease, and Insurers 
Won’t Pay for It. New York Times. 2017 June 22; Sect. A1.
29. Philippidis A. Sarepta, BioMarin Settle Exon-Skipping 
Patent Dispute. GEN News. 2017 July 18. Available from: 
http://www.genengnews.com/gen-news-highlights/sarep-
ta-biomarin-settle-exon-skipping-patent-dispute/81254672.
30. Dever DP, et al. CRISPR/Cas9 β-globin Gene Target-
ing in Human Haematopoietic Stem Cells. Nature. 
2016;539(7629):384-389.
31. Roin BN. Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patent-
ability. Tex Law Rev. 2009;87(3):503-570.
32. Novel Drug Approvals for 2016. FDA. Available from: 
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ 
DrugInnovation/ucm483775.htm.
33. Novel Drug Approvals for 2015. FDA. Available from: 
the therapies’ development with the clinical reward to 
patients. Encouraging therapeutic developers to focus their 
research efforts on clinical needs, rather than monetary 
desires, will similarly require careful—and creative—
thinking. And assessing what role generic competitors can 
play in CRISPR-based precision medicine needs further 
regulatory and legislative attention. These challenges are, 
in a way, good problems to have. Revolutionary gene-
therapy technology does not come along frequently. But 
it is precisely the novelty and power of CRISPR—and 
the potential effects of its patent landscape on the public 
health—that counsel us to solve these problems before it 
is too late for patients.
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